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In the past month, the US markedly escalated its efforts to roll back the European Union's (EU)
banana import restrictions which are tantamount to quotas on exports from Latin American nations
given that some US corporations operating in the region are suffering substantially. On Sept. 27,
the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) announced its decision to fight the banana quotas
through the World Trade Organization (WTO), since the US argues that the quotas constitute an
unfair trade practise. Then, in late October, Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan) majority leader in the US Senate
and the leading presidential candidate for the Republican Party in the 1996 elections introduced a
new bill that would, if approved, apply trade sanctions against Costa Rica and Colombia, both of
which have accepted the EU banana quotas in exchange for preferential treatment for their exports.
The banana dispute first erupted in mid-1993, when the EU unilaterally decided to impose an
annual limit on banana imports from Latin American countries. Under the quota system, the EU
allowed the region's banana exporters to ship up to 2.2 million metric tons of the fruit to the 12
member nations of the EU at a preferential tariff rate of 20%, or US$123.60 per MT. Beyond the
maximum tonnage, however, the duty leaps to US$1,050.60 per MT (see NotiSur, 01/28/93, 02/18/93,
03/05/93, and 07/08/93). The import quota is aimed at reserving a share of the European banana
market for producers in former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific region
(ACP).
The EU regulations favor such Caribbean island nations as Jamaica, Martinique, Guadeloupe,
Montserrat and St. Lucia. Those countries, which were supplying about 15% of the European banana
market when the import restrictions took effect, were having a hard time competing with other Latin
American exporters and with US-based multinationals operating in the region, since production on
the largely family-owned plantations in the Caribbean is inefficient and expensive. The restrictions
against Latin American exporters, however, generated bitter reactions in the region because the
EU banana market is particularly lucrative. Bananas earn on average about US$18 for each 18.14 kg
box sold in the EU, compared with about US$10 per box in the US and only about US$8 on the open
world market. Moreover, the import restrictions led to global overproduction of bananas since Latin
American producers were forced to dump their excess fruit on the open market, driving the price
down even more since 1993.
As a result, Latin American banana exporting nations grouped in the Union de Paises Exportadores
de Banano (UPEB) estimate they have lost a combined total of US$350 million per year since the
quotas took effect. The three US-based multinationals with banana operations in Latin America
and the Caribbean Chiquita Brands International, Del Monte, and Standard Fruit have also been
affected by the quota system, although by far Chiquita has suffered the most because the other two
companies initiated a much more aggressive response early on to prepare for the quotas. Among
other things, for example, Standard Fruit and Del Monte increased their holdings in Caribbeanbased operations to take advantage of the EU's preferential treatment for ACP countries. The
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total percentage of shares held by Standard Fruit and Del Monte in EU banana companies and in
domestic firms in the ACP nations grew from 6% in 1992 to 31% in 1994, according to a recent study
commissioned by the EU to assess the impact of the EU quota system on US corporations. As a
result, Standard Fruit's total share of the EU market actually grew from 11% to 15% between 1991
and 1994, and Del Monte's share increased from 7.5% to 8% in the same period.
In contrast, Chiquita Brands whose response to the EU quotas was extremely sluggish in
comparison with the other two US corporations saw its share of the EU market plummet from 25%
in 1991 to 18.5% by 1994, according to the EU study. Not surprisingly, then, that company has been
the most vocal critic of the EU quotas in the US, although all three US corporations oppose the
import quotas, which they regard as an illegal trade barrier that breaches accords contained in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). When the quota system took effect in 1993, all the
Latin American banana exporting countries were unanimously opposed, and they vowed to jointly
fight the regulations through GATT's legal channels.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the losses suffered by US banana corporations, the US government
did not actively join the Latin American countries in challenging the EU quotas, although
Washington did express its support for the Latin American efforts. At that time, the US and the
EU were still involved in GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations, and to avoid snagging the general
GATT accords, the two sides agreed "in principle" to temporarily postpone discussion of the EU
banana quotas until after the Uruguay Round was completed. Under the tentative accord with the
EU, the US agreed not to challenge the quotas through the WTO in exchange for an agreement by
the EU to eventually negotiate concessions that would offset the quota's effect on US corporations.
Given the US "understanding" with the EU, the ability of the Latin American nations to roll back
the EU's quota system through the WTO was weakened. Consequently, in late 1994 the Latin
American nations became divided over how to respond to the EU quotas, with some of the UPEB
nations advocating negotiations with the EU to achieve concessions to offset the quotas, and others
maintaining hard-line opposition to any acceptance of the quota system.
In early 1995, the countries formally divided into two camps. Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua decided to accept an EU offer to assign individual shares of the Latin American global
quota to each country, thereby eliminating competition among those nations by guaranteeing that
each country could count on a reserved market for its fruit. In exchange, those four countries agreed
to end their efforts to legally challenge the quota system through the WTO. Under the accord, Costa
Rica received an EU guarantee of 23.4% of the Latin American import quota. Colombia received
21%, Nicaragua 3%, and Venezuela 2%, giving those four nations a combined total of 49.4% of the 2.2
million MT import quota assigned to Latin America.
The decision by those countries to accept the quota system had two effects. First, it pushed them
into direct confrontation with the other five banana exporters in the region: Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Panama, and Mexico. Those countries which accused the other four nations of tacitly
legitimizing the EU's import regulations by signing the agreement vowed to continue to legally fight
the quotas. Second, it radicalized for the first time US opposition to the EU system because the EU's
offer to assign market shares to the four countries in turn paved the way for new regulations over
how the individual market percentages would be managed by each country. The new regulations
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directly affected the US banana corporations, particularly Chiquita Brands. Under the old system,
transnational banana distributors such as Chiquita handled all import licenses granted by the EU,
and the multinationals therefore controlled the decisions over the amount that domestic producers
in Latin American countries would contribute to the total that a given company exported to the EU.
But under the new quota agreement signed with the four participating Latin American nations, the
EU turned over to the governments of those four nations the right to distribute 70% of the EU import
licenses, leaving only 30% of the contracts in the hands of the transnationals. That particularly
affected Chiquita Brands's operations in Costa Rica. That company is only a minor banana producer
in Costa Rica, but until now it was the largest distributor of Costa Rican bananas in the EU. In fact,
the change in regulations led to a direct dispute between the Costa Rican government and Chiquita
because the government decided to use its new control over licenses to reserve a larger percentage
of exports for domestic producers. That reduced the amount of fruit that Chiquita could distribute
in the EU from its own plantations, and at the same time it forced Chiquita to offer higher prices
to domestic producers in order to earn the right to distribute their fruit in the EU (see NotiSur,
06/08/95).
Consequently, Chiquita backed by the five Latin American governments that oppose the EU
quotas began to lobby heavily in Washington to push the US Congress and President Bill Clinton's
administration to pressure the EU to roll back its quota system. Chiquita also lobbied for the USTR
to take action to force the four Latin American nations that signed the EU agreement to renege on
that accord. On Aug. 16, high-level representatives from the five regional governments opposed
to the EU which have been dubbed the "Group of Five" (G-5) met in Washington with US Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor to discuss proposals for a joint effort to fight the import quotas.
In particular, the G-5 requested that the US initiate a formal demand in the WTO to roll back the
quotas.
"In 1993, the EU unilaterally imposed a highly protectionist set of regulations that enforces quotas
and special licenses for banana imports reminiscent of the worst forms of mercantalist abuse and
market manipulation," said Ecuador's Minister of Agriculture, Mariano Gonzalez, who attended
the meeting with Kantor. "The latest development in this affair is the new accord that some Latin
American nations signed with the EU. That accord greatly aggravates the protectionist measures
by providing special export privileges to some countries in the region at the expense of others. This
especially harms Ecuador, which is the world's largest exporter of bananas."
During the meeting, the G-5 harshly criticized the four nations that signed the accord with the EU,
not just because the agreement strengthened the EU's position in the banana dispute, but because
the market shares that the accord grants to those four countries do not reflect their real share of
annual banana exports to the EU. According to the G-5, although those countries have been given
nearly 50% of the Latin American import quota, until now they have only contributed a combined
total of 35% of the Latin American bananas shipped to the EU each year. On Sept. 27, the Clinton
administration formally announced its intention to file a complaint with the WTO to overturn the
EU banana quotas. According to the USTR, the US will be joined in its case by the governments of
Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras. The banana complaint, which could take up to a year before a
final resolution is reached, marks the second time since the WTO was formed that the US has taken
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a trade dispute to the organization. Last July, the WTO brokered a case between the US and South
Korea involving trade barriers against US exports of beef and pork.
"We have repeatedly sought changes in the European banana regimen to address the discrimination
against US companies, but unfortunately the EU has been inflexible," said Mickey Kantor. "We are
pleased that other countries in our region that are also adversely affected by the regimen are joining
us in the WTO case." Apparently, the EU's intransigent stance regarding negotiations with the US
led to the USTR decision to petition the WTO in the case. Despite the understanding reached with
the EU during the Uruguay Round negotiations, the EU has refused to even consider rolling back its
quota system, and EU authorities have consistently resisted any substantial concessions to the US
that might soften the impact of the quotas. Indeed, in June the EU's Council of Ministers approved
a resolution that recommended that the EU refuse to even open negotiations with the US because
such talks could eventually lead to discussion of the quota system itself, rather than measures to
offset the import regulations.
"The Community's position would be tactically weakened if we open negotiations because it would
be tantamount to accepting the legitimacy of the US's arguments," read the declaration. Moreover,
the EU has been unable to overcome internal differences over the quotas, which, in turn, has
aggravated the dispute with the US and Latin American exporters. Great Britain, France, Spain,
Italy, and Portugal are the most ardent advocates of the quotas since they are the nations most
interested in reserving the EU market for producers in their former colonies. In contrast, Germany
and to a lesser extent Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Ireland favor minimal
import restrictions. As a result, any effort to increase the import quota which could reduce the US
and Latin American opposition has been met with stiff resistance from the EU countries that most
favor the restrictions. For example, most of the banana exporting countries expected the EU to
increase the annual quota from the 2.2 million MT set in 1993 to 2.55 million MT this year because
the 12-member EU has been expanded to 15 members with the addition of Sweden, Finland, and
Austria.
Nevertheless, at the latest meeting of EU agricultural ministers in August the participants were
unable to agree on the size of the quota increase because those countries favoring the restrictions
wanted to reserve most of the market in the three new EU member countries for ACP nations, even
though those three countries traditionally have bought their bananas from Latin American exporters
rather than ACP producers. Even if the EU increased the quota to 2.55 million MT, it would have
very little impact on the US and Latin American resolve to fight the quotas through the WTO. The
G-5 nations have demanded that even if they were to "temporarily" accept the quota system, the
amount reserved for Latin American nations would have to be increased to a minimum of 3 million
MT, since the UPEB nations had already been selling more than 2.6 million MT on the European
market before the quota system took effect.
Meanwhile, alongside the US decision to fight the EU through the WTO, the US has also stepped up
its pressure on the four countries that signed the compromise agreement with the EU. In October
1994, the USTR had opened an investigation of Costa Rica and Colombia under Section 301 of the
US Trade Act, which requires the US to retaliate if unfair trade practices are found to injure US
businesses. The investigation was frozen last June after the Costa Rican government offered to open
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bilateral negotiations over concessions to Chiquita Brands. But those talks have not progressed,
and Chiquita in any case insists that Costa Rica must reverse its endorsement of the EU quota
system. Not surprisingly, in September the USTR announced that the investigation of Costa Rica
and Colombia will be reinitiated.
Greatly aggravating the situation, on Oct. 19 US Sen. Bob Dole introduced a bill in the Senate
to apply trade sanctions against Costa Rica and Colombia in retaliation for their compromise
agreement with the EU. If approved, the bill would suspend those countries' participation in the
US's Generalized System of Trade Benefits (GSP). In the case of Costa Rica, it would also suspend
that nation's participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). So far, the bill has made no
progress in the Senate, in part because Costa Rica immediately mounted a lobbying blitz in the US
Congress and in the State Department to convince legislators and representatives of the Clinton
administration to seek negotiations rather than confrontation with Costa Rica. In any case, Sen. Dole
could face a major political controversy over the bill if the initiative moves forward.
According to the Journal of Commerce, the Chiquita Brands owner, Carl Lindner, made a US
$140,000 donation to the Republican Party fund in mid-1995, which will benefit Dole's presidential
campaign if he wins the party nomination next year. The newspaper claims that after Lindner made
the contribution, Dole promised to introduce a bill in Congress that would penalize Costa Rica
over the banana affair. Dole's bill generated harsh nationalist reactions in Costa Rica. "Bob Dole
has declared war on us," read an editorial in the influential daily La Nacion, the country's biggest
newspaper. "
At the bottom of all this is an aggression on the part of the world's biggest military and
economic power against a nation that cannot defend itself...The manipulation of commercial
sanctions to satisfy very specific private interests, divorced from genuine priorities of the US, is
lamentable." [Sources: Associated Press, 06/07/95, 09/27/95; United Press International, 10/06/95;
Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 07/06/95, 10/19/95; Tico Times (Costa Rica), 09/02/95,
10/20/95; La Nacion (Costa Rica), 10/20/95; Inter Press Service, 09/12/95, 09/20/95, 09/28/95, 10/23/95;
Notimex, 07/06/95, 07/07/95, 07/10/95, 07/13-15/95, 07/25-27/95, 08/29/95, 10/20/95, 10/24/95; Agence
France-Presse, 07/05/95, 07/06/95, 07/11/95, 07/17/95, 07/27/95, 08/16/95, 10/23/95, 10/25/95, 10/28/95;
Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias-Spanish news service EFE, 10/30/95]
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